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In randomness amplification a slightly random source is used to produce an improved
random source. Perhaps surprisingly, a single source of randomness cannot be amplified
at all classically. However, the situation is different if one considers correlations allowed
by quantum mechanics as an extra resource. Here we present a protocol that amplifies
Santha-Vazirani sources arbitrarily close to deterministic into fully random sources. The
protocol is device independent, depending only on the observed statistics of the devices
and on the validity of the no-signaling principle between different devices. It improves
previously-known protocols in two respects. First the protocol is tolerant to noise so that
even noisy quantum-mechanical systems give rise to good devices for the protocol. Second
it is simpler, being based on the violation of a four-party Bell inequality and on the XOR as a
hash function. As a technical tool we prove a new de Finetti theorem where the subsystems
are selected from a Santha-Vazirani source.
I. INTRODUCTION
Inferring the presence of completely random processes in nature is of both fundamental and
practical importance, with applications ranging from cryptography and numerical simulations to
gambling. Even though in applications one usually needs a source of nearly perfect random bits
(unbiased and uncorrelated with anything else), in practice only imperfect randomness is avail-
able. Is there a way of amplifying the quality of a source of randomness? Perhaps surprisingly the
answer is negative in the classical world [1]: one can never amplify the randomness of a unique
random source 1.
As randomness sources we consider Santha-Vazirani sources [1], defined by the property that
for any bit string X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) produced by the source and for any 1 ≤ i < n,
1
2
− ε ≤ p(Xi+1 = 0|Xi, . . . , X1) ≤ 1
2
+ ε. (1)
Thus each bit produced by a ε-SV source can be seen as the flip of a biased coin, with the bias
determined by the history of the process, but always upper bounded by ε. The goal of randomness
amplification is to use an ε-SV source to produce a bit that is as close as possible to a fully random
bit. In [1] it was proved that for every ε′ < ε there is no protocol transforming an ε-SV source into
an ε′-SV source.
The impossibility result of [1] only holds for classical protocols, leaving open the possibility
that with non-classical resources randomness amplification might be possible. Indeed the viola-
tion of Bell inequalities by quantum correlations implies that the measurement outcomes could
1 If one has access to two or more independent sources, randomness amplification is possible classically.
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2not have been predetermined, so one may be tempted to conclude that Bell experiments already
achieve randomness amplification. However, this conclusion is marred by the fact that the Bell
tests also require measurement settings to be chosen randomly; without this measurement inde-
pendence, it is possible to construct deterministic models to explain the Bell violation [2, 3].
In a seminal work, Colbeck and Renner [4] used the violation of Bell inequalities by quantum
correlations to infer that, in contrast to the classical case, randomness amplification is possible for
ε-SV sources for a certain range of ε. The main idea was to use the imperfect random bits from the
SV source to choose the measurement settings of a set of spatially separated observers in a Bell
test. The only assumption made was the validity of the no-signaling principle; in fact this was
shown to be also necessary for perfect randomness to occur in any theory [4].
Ref. [4] left open the question of whether any SV source, as long as not fully deterministic,
could be amplified into a perfect source. This was answered in the affirmative by Gallego et al. in
[5], where it was shown that even from an arbitrarily small non-zero amount of randomness in
the SV source, one may obtain perfectly random bits by using quantum correlations that violate
a five-party Bell inequality. However the protocol does not tolerate noise and requires a large
number of devices for its implementation. See also [6–10] for more recent work in the area.
It may be helpful to distinguish randomness amplification from the task of (device-
independent) randomness expansion, where one assumes that an input seed of perfect random
bits is available and the goal is to expand a given random bit string into a larger sequence of ran-
dom bits. Quantum non-locality has found application also in this latter task [11–16, 20] as well
as in device-independent cryptographic scenarios (see e.g. [17–19, 21, 22]).
A. Result
In this paper we present a protocol for randomness amplification secure against no-signalling
adversaries that can tolerate a constant rate of noise depending only on the quality of the initial
random source.
Theorem 1 (informal). For every ε > 0, there is a protocol using an ε-SV source and O(log(1/ε′))
non-signalling devices that with high probability either produces a bit that is ε′-close to uniform or aborts.
Moreover single-qubit local measurements on many-copies of a four-qubits entangled quantum state, with
poly(1 − 2ε) error rate (per qubit of the state or measurement) give rise to devices that do not abort the
protocol with high probability.
See Proposition 3 for more a precise formulation of the result.
As we discuss in the next subsection, the protocol is also simpler than the one presented in
[5]. First it is based on the violation of a four-partite Bell inequality, instead of a five-partite one.
Second it uses the XOR as a hash function, in place of a random function.
B. Overview of the Protocol and of its Correctness Proof
Here we give an overview of the protocol for randomness amplification and give a high-level
explanation of why it works. The protocol is depicted in Fig 1 and outlined in Fig ??. It involves
4k non-signalling boxes. Each box can be reused several times and it is assumed that there are no
signalling from the future to the past inside each box (see section II B).
We split the boxes into k groups of 4 boxes each. We call each group a device. In each device
the goal is to violate a particular four-partite Bell inequality, with 2 inputs and outputs for each
of the 4 parties. The inequality is stated explicitly in section II A. Its violating ”maximally” when
3the value is zero (the minimum possible value). Here we are mostly concerned with the following
interesting property that makes the inequality useful for randomness amplification: Given any
non-signalling box violating the inequality maximally, the bit (p, 1− p) corresponding to the ma-
jority of the first three output bits, given any input, is such that 1/4 ≤ p ≤ 3/4. If the value of the
Bell inequality is only δ, then we have
1/4−O(δ) ≤ p ≤ 3/4 +O(δ). (2)
This fact is established by a linear programming argument (similarly to [5]) in Lemma 4. Therefore
if we had the promise that the box at hand violates the Bell inequality close to maximally, one
could extract (imperfect) certified randomness by choosing a deterministic input.
Suppose further that we had k devices with Bell value approximately zero and that we were
promised the devices were product with each other, with the outputs of each device not depend-
ing on either the inputs or the outputs of the others. Then by choosing deterministic inputs
to all the devices one would obtain k independent bits with distributions (pi, 1 − pi) satisfying
1/4−O(δ) ≤ pi ≤ 3/4+O(δ). As we show in Lemma 5, computing the XOR of the bits one would
obtain a bit (q, 1− q) such that
1/2− (1/4 +O(δ))k ≤ q ≤ 1/2 + (1/4 +O(δ))k, (3)
which is arbitrarily close to uniform for k sufficiently large. However typically the devices will
not be independent of each other and there is no a priori guarantee that the boxes violate the Bell
inequality.
Let us first address the first challenge that the devices might not be product . An important
ingredient of the protocol is a procedure to reduce the general case to the case of uncorrelated
boxes. To this goal we prove a new version of the de Finetti theorem (see Lemma 6). Suppose
we choose (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ [n1] × . . . × [nk] 2 from an ε-SV source (with n1, . . . , nk fixed integers)
and reuse the j-th device aj times. Then the de Finetti bound says that the distribution of the k
devices in their last use (given by aj for the j-th device), conditioned on the inputs and outputs of
all previous uses, is close to independent (as long as n1, . . . nk are chosen large enough, with their
sizes increasing with 1/2 − ε). The proof of this bound is based on the information-theoretical
approach of [23, 24] and might be of independent interest. Thus after reusing many times the
devices we are in a situation of having k (close to) uncorrelated devices.
The second challenge consists in ensuring that most of the k devices, which are approximately
uncorrelated, violate the Bell inequality close to maximally. In order to do so we perform a statis-
tical test to try to estimate the average Bell inequality violation of them, and reject if such value
is not sufficiently close to zero. Here we have to address the difficulty that the inputs to the de-
vices are chosen from a ε-SV source, while the value of the Bell inequality that we would like to
estimate is calculated over uniform input. This is the content of Lemma 7.
In the next sections we provide a full description of the protocol and its correctness proof.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we state the Bell inequality we will employ, explain what are the assumptions
we impose on the devices, and then define the notion of randomness relative to an eavesdropper
that we will consider.
2 [n] stands for the set {1, . . . , n}.
4Device 1 (n1 boxes)
u12 u22 un22
x12 x22 xn22
u13 u23 un33
x13 x23 xn33
Device k (nk boxes)
u1k u2k unkk
x1k x2k xnkk
Time-ordered no-signaling
...
ua22
xa22
ua33
xa33
uakk
xakk
Device 2 (n2 boxes)
q(xa11, ..., xakk|ua11,...,uakk) ≈ 
q(xa11|ua11) ⊗ ...⊗q(xakk|uakk)
ua11 ua22 uakk
xa11 xa22 xakk
Verification test 
passed
Sr = ⊕j mj
u11 u21 un11
x11 x21 xn11xa11
ua11
S V
No-signaling
FIG. 1: Illustration of the protocol for randomness amplification
A. The Bell inequality
The inequality we consider for the task of randomness amplification involves four spatially
separated parties with measurement settings u = {u1, u2, u3, u4} and respective outcomes x =
{x1, x2, x3, x4}. Each party chooses one of two measurement settings with two outcomes each so
that ui ∈ {0, 1} and xi ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ {1, .., 4}. Half of the 24 possible measurements enter the
inequality and these can be divided into two sets
U0 = {{0001}, {0010}, {0100}, {1000}} and U1 = {{0111}, {1011}, {1101}, {1110}}. (4)
The inequality is then [25]∑
x,u
(I⊕4i=1xi=0 Iu∈U0 + I⊕4i=1xi=1 Iu∈U1) P (x|u) ≥ 2, (5)
where the indicator function IL = 1 if L is true and 0 otherwise. The local hidden variable bound
is 2 and there exist no-signaling distributions that reach the algebraic limit of 0. For any no-
signaling box represented by a vector of probabilities {P (x|u)}, the Bell inequality may be written
as
B.{P (x|u)} =
∑
x,u
B(x,u)P (x|u) ≥ 2, (6)
5where B is an indicator vector for the Bell inequality with 24 × 24 entries
B(x,u) = I⊕4i=1xi=0 Iu∈U0 + I⊕4i=1xi=1 Iu∈U1 . (7)
Consider the quantum state
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|φ−〉|φ˜+〉+ |ψ+〉|ψ˜−〉), (8)
where |φ−〉 = 1√2(|0〉|0〉 − |1〉|1〉), |ψ+〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉|1〉 + |1〉|0〉), |φ˜+〉 = 1√2(|0〉|+〉 + |1〉|−〉), and
|ψ˜−〉 = 1√2(|0〉|−〉 − |1〉|+〉). Measurements in the X basis
{|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)} (9)
correspond to ui = 0 and measurements in the Z basis
{|0〉, |1〉} (10)
correspond to ui = 1 for each of the four parties i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. These measurements on |Ψ〉
lead to the algebraic violation of the inequality, i.e., the sum of the probabilities appearing in the
inequality is zero.
The reason for the choice of this Bell inequality is twofold. Firstly, as we have seen, there
exist quantum correlations achieving the maximal no-signaling violation of the inequality, which
implies that free randomness amplification starting from any initial  of the SV source may be
possible. Secondly, we will show (in Lemma 4) that for any measurement setting appearing in
the inequality u ∈ U0 ∪ U1, the majority function of the first three outputs maj(x1, x2, x3) (where
maj(x1, x2, x3) = 0 if at least two of {x1, x2, x3} are 0 and 1 otherwise) cannot be predicted with
certainty, given any no-signaling box that violates the inequality close to its algebraic maximum
value.
B. Assumptions on the Devices
In the protocol, we consider 4k + 1 devices that cannot signal among themselves and assume
that one of the devices is help by an external party (for example, an eavesdropper Eve). We
describe the correlations in the 4k devices by the following joint probability distribution:
P (x1≤n1 , . . . , x
k
≤nk ,Z|u1≤n1 , . . . ,uk≤nk ,W), (11)
where e.g. x1≤n1 denotes the vector (x
1
1, . . . , x
1
n1). For device j with 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the inputs and out-
puts of the lj-th box (associated to the lj-th use of the device) are given by u
j
lj
and xjlj , respectively.
Likewise the input and output of the last device (held by the eavesdropper) are given by W and
Z. One may think of the adversary holding the set of random variables Z,W and supplying 4k de-
vices which produce the conditional probability distribution P whose behavior depends on Z and
W. We say P is a (4k;n1, . . . , nk) time-ordered non-signaling box, meaning that it is non-signaling
between each of the 4k devices and time-ordered non-signaling within each device.
As in previous works on randomness amplification [4–7, 9], we make the assumption
that the ε-SV source and the boxes can be correlated with each other only through the no-
signaling adversary Eve. In other words, we assume that the SV source, Eve’s random vari-
ables (Z,W) and the box P constitute a Markov chain, so that given (Z = z,W = w), the box
P (x1≤n1 , . . . , x
k
≤nk |u1≤n1 , . . . ,uk≤nk ,Z = z,W = w) is independent of the bits produced by the
source.
6C. Randomness Criterion
To quantify the quality of the output we will use of the distance to uniform of a random vari-
able S ∈ Σ, conditioned on Eve’s input and output:
d(S|Z,W) := 1
2
max
s,w,z
|P (S = s|Z = z,W = w)− 1/|Σ||. (12)
Although this function is convenient to work, it is not universally composable. A better defi-
nition of randomness relative to an eavesdropper is the following (see e.g. [19]):
dc(S|Z,W) := 1
2
|Σ|−1∑
s=0
max
w
∑
z
P (z|w)|P (S = s|Z = z,W = w)− 1/|Σ||, (13)
with |Σ| the size of Σ.
However there is the following relation between them:
Lemma 2. For a random variable S ∈ Σ,
dc(S|Z,W) ≤ |Σ|d(S|Z,W). (14)
Proof.
1
2
|Σ|−1∑
s=0
max
w
∑
z
P (z|w)|P (S = s|Z = z,W = w)− 1/|Σ||
≤ |Σ|
2
max
s,w
∑
z
P (z|w)|P (S = s|Z = z,W = w)− 1/|Σ||
≤ |Σ|
2
max
s,w,z
|P (S = s|Z = z,W = w)− 1/|Σ||
= |Σ|d(S|Z,W). (15)
uunionsq
III. PROOF OF CORRECTNESS OF THE PROTOCOL
We will be interested in the protocol with the following parameters:
n1 = 1, n
1−log (1+2ε)
i = 8 ln (2)k
2t3ni−1. (16)
for a parameter t > 0.
Proposition 3. Let (n1, . . . , nk) be given by Eq. (16). Then conditioned on not aborting, the bit Sr
produced by the protocol is such that
dc(Sr|Z,W) ≤
(
11 + 7δ
16
)µk
+ 2e−
k( 12−ε)
8
(1−µ)2δ2
8 + 4/
√
t. (17)
Moreover if the box is realized by performing measurements which are O(δ(1−µ)(1− 2ε)4)-close to either
one of the measurements of Eqs. (9, 10) on states which are O(δ(1 − µ)(1 − 2ε)4)-close to the state of Eq.
(8), then the protocol accepts with high probability.
7Protocol
1. The ε-SV source generates 4M bits which are used by the parties to choose the measurement settings
u1≤m1 , . . . ,u
k
≤mk for the 4k devices, whereM =
∑k
j=1mj . The measurements are performed sequen-
tially on each device. The devices produce the output bits x1≤m1 , . . . , x
k
≤mk . After the measurements,
the parties discard the settings that do not appear in the Bell inequality in Eq. (5) and a number nj
of runs remain in the j-th device for 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
2. The parties choose one box aj from each device using log nj bits from the ε-SV source, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
3. The parties perform an estimation of the violation of the Bell inequality in the chosen boxes by
computing the empirical average Zk := 1k
∑k
i=1B(xai ,uai). The protocol is aborted unless Zk ≤(
1
2 − ε
)4 δ
2 (1− µ) (with fixed constants δ, µ).
4. Conditioned on not aborting in the previous step, the parties compute mj := maj(x1j , x
2
j , x
3
j ) for all
1 ≤ j ≤ k, and output the bit Sr = ⊕kj=1mj .
FIG. 2: Protocol for device-independent randomness amplification
Remark: As a corollary of the theorem we find that using O(l log(l/ε)) devices we can extract l bits
which are ε-close in variational distance to l uniform bits.
Proof. First we apply the results of Lemma 6 to the time-ordered no-signaling box
P (x1≤n1 , . . . , x
k
≤nk |u1≤n1 , . . . ,uk≤nk ,Z = z,W = w). Under the Markov assumption that the SV
source and this box are uncorrelated, Lemma 6 gives that the k boxes chosen one from each de-
vice with the ε-SV source are uncorrelated with high probability. For uncorrelated boxes,
δl = B.{Pu<l,x<l(xl|ul)} = B.{P (xl|ul)}, (18)
for 1 ≤ l ≤ k. Lemma 7 applied to these k boxes, in turn, implies that when the test accepts,
(q(x1a1 , . . . , x
k
ak
|u1a1 , . . . ,ukak), (u1a1 , . . . ,ukak)), (x1a1 , . . . , xkak) are (µ, δ) good with high probability. In
other words, when the test accepts, with high probability a fraction µk of the boxes has Bell value
smaller than δ. We may therefore, up to the error in the de Finetti bound (given by Eq. (33)) and
in the verification procedure (given in Lemma 7), apply Lemma 4 to the k uncorrelated boxes (of
which µk have a good Bell value). Then by Lemma 5, the XOR of the bits from these boxes gives
a perfectly free random bit for k sufficiently large.
We begin by estimating the error in the de Finetti bound in Lemma 6. Let us apply Lemma 6
with ti = kt, for all 2 ≤ i ≤ k, and block sizes according to n1−log (1+2ε)i = 8 ln (2)k3t3ni−1. Then
we obtain that
Pr
(a1,...,ak)∼ν([n1]×···×[nk])
(
T ≥ 1
t
)
≤ 1
t
. (19)
with T given by Eq. (34). Thus with probability larger than 1 − 1/t over the (a1, . . . , ak) we have
T ≤ 1t . By Markov inequality we have that for such good choices of (a1, . . . , ak),
Pr
u1<a1 ,...,u
k
<ak
∼νa1,...,ak
x1<a1 ,...,x
k
<ak
∼P
(T ′ ≥ η) ≤ T
η
≤ 1
tη
. (20)
with
T ′ := Eu1a1 ,...,ukak
∥∥∥q(x1a1 , . . . , xkak |u1a1 , . . . ,ukak)− q(x1a1 |u1a1)⊗ . . .⊗ q(xkak |ukak)∥∥∥1 , (21)
8Choosing η = 1/
√
t we find that with probability larger than 1 − 1/t − 1/√t, the k chosen boxes
and the chosen inputs will be such that T ′ ≤ 1/√t.
For the ideal product state q(x1a1 |u1a1)⊗. . .⊗q(xkak |ukak), when the verification test in step 3 of the
protocol (Fig. 2) accepts, we may infer that µk of the boxes have good Bell value with probability
1− exp
(
−k (12 − ε)8 (1− µ)2δ2/8). Then applying Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 we find
d(m1 ⊕ · · · ⊕mk|Z,W) ≤ 1
2
(
11 + 7δ
16
)µk(
1− e−
k( 12−ε)
8
(1−µ)2δ2
8
)
+ e−
k( 12−ε)
8
(1−µ)2δ2
8 . (22)
Therefore by Eq. (21), if the test accepts
d(m1 ⊕ · · · ⊕mk|Z,W) ≤ 1
2
(
11 + 7δ
16
)µk
+ e−
k( 12−ε)
8
(1−µ)2δ2
8 + 2/
√
t. (23)
Eq. (17) follows from Lemma 2.
The robustness of the protocol follows from Lemma 9. uunionsq
IV. TOOLS FOR THE CORRECTNESS PROOFS
A. Randomness Amplification from Uncorrelated Good Devices
The first step in the proof of the protocol is the particular case where one has m uncorrelated
boxes P1(x1|u1), . . . , Pm(xm|um) which are good in the sense that for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m
B.{Pj(xj |uj)} ≤ δ, (24)
for some δ ≥ 0. We first show that the predictability of the majority bit obtained from a good box
is bounded from above by a linear function of δ. Then considering a large numberm of such good
boxes that are uncorrelated from each other, we show that the XOR of the majority bits from these
boxes can give rise to a perfect random bit.
Lemma 4. Consider a 4-partite no-signaling box P (x|u) satisfying Eq. (24) for some δ ≥ 0. Let m :=
maj(x1, x2, x3). Then
d (m|Z,W) ≤ 1
2
(
11 + 7δ
16
)
. (25)
Proof. In order to prove the lemma, we first formulate the distance from uniform of the majority
bit m as a linear program and obtain an upper bound on the distance from a feasible solution of
the dual program. The distance from uniform in Eq. (12) can be obtained by the following linear
program
d (m|Z,W) = max
{P}
:
1
2
MT .{P (x|u)}
s.t. A.{P (x|u)} ≤ c. (26)
Here, the indicator vector M is a 24 × 24 element vector with entries
M(x,u) = Iu=u∗Imaj(x1,x2,x3)=0 − Iu=u∗Imaj(x1,x2,x3)=1 (27)
9for any chosen measurement setting u∗ ∈ U0 ∪ U1. Analogous programs can be formulated for
each of the 8 measurement settings appearing in the Bell inequality in Eq. (5). The constraint on
the box {P (x|u)} written as a vector with 24 × 24 entries is given by the matrix A and the vector
c. These encode the no-signaling constraints between the four parties, the normalization and the
positivity constraints on the probabilities P (x|u). In addition, A and c also encode the condition
that B.{P (x|u)} ≤ δ where δ is a parameter that encodes the Bell value for the box.
The solution to the primal linear program in Eq. (26) can be bounded by any feasible solution
to the dual program which is written as
min
λ
: cTλ
s.t. ATλ = M,
λ ≥ 0. (28)
Any vector λ∗ that is feasible in the sense that it satisfies the constraints to the dual program above
gives an upper bound cTλ∗ to the distance from uniform, i.e.
d (m|Z,W) ≤ 1
2
cTλ∗, (29)
provided λ∗ satisfies the constraints in Eq. (28). In the Appendix, we explicitly show such a
feasible λ∗ for the measurement setting {u1u2u3u4} = {0001} that gives cTλ∗ = (11+7δ16 ). Similar
feasible λ∗ can be found for all the 8 measurement settings appearing in the Bell inequality which
therefore gives
d (m|Z,W) ≤ 1
2
(
11 + 7δ
16
)
. (30)
This completes the proof. uunionsq
Assume that we obtain m independent boxes satisfying Eq. (24). From Lemma 4, we know
that the predictability of the majority bits obtained from such boxes is bounded. We now show
that the XOR of such majority bits leads to a bit that is perfectly random in the limit of large m.
Lemma 5. Let Xi, i = 1, . . . ,m be independent binary random variables with P (Xi = 0) = pi satisfying
1
2 − i ≤ pi ≤ 12 + i. Then p = P (X1⊕ . . . Xm = 0) satisfies 12 −  ≤ p ≤ 12 +  with  = 2m−1
∏m
i=1 i.
Proof. Consider first the case m = 2 and set X = X1, Y = X2. We get that
p ≡ P (X ⊕ Y = 0) = P (X = 0, Y = 0) + P (X = 1, Y = 1) =
P (X = 0)P (Y = 0) + P (X = 1)P (Y = 1) = p1p2 + (1− p1)(1− p2) (31)
Note that global extrema of the above function of p1 and p2 are on the boundary. Indeed, for any
fixed p1, the function is linear in p2, hence optimal p2 are the extremal ones. In turn, for any of the
two extremal values of p2, the function is again linear in p1, so that optimal are extremal p1. Thus
we have to check four cases: (p1, p2) being (12 ± 1, 12 ± 2). This gives
1
2
−  ≤ p ≤ 1
2
+  (32)
where  = 212. Thus the formula is valid for m = 2. For arbitrary m, the result follows from
induction, by assuming that X1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ Xm−1 satisfies the formula for m − 1, setting X = X1 ⊕
. . .⊕Xm−1, Y = Xm and applying the result for two random variables. uunionsq
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B. Imposing Independence: de Finetti bounds
In this section, we show that a set of k boxes chosen one from each device using an ε-SV source
is close (in trace distance) to being uncorrelated for some suitable choice of block sizes nj . The
Lemmas in this section are inspired by the information-theoretic approach of [23] for proving de
Finetti theorems for quantum states and non-signaling distributions.
Lemma 6. Let P (x1≤n1 , . . . , x
k
≤nk |u1≤n1 , . . . ,uk≤nk) be a time-ordered non-signaling distribution, with out-
put and input alphabets Σ and Λ, respectively (i.e. P : Σ×n × Λ×n → R+). The distribution P represents
k devices each with nj devices. Let (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ [n1]× . . .× [nk] and (u1≤n1 , . . . ,uk≤nk) be chosen from
a ε-SV source ν(a1, . . . , ak,u1≤n1 , . . . ,u
k
≤nk).
Then for every set of positive reals {t2, . . . , tk},
Pr
(a1,...,ak)∼ν
T ≥ k∑
i=2
√√√√8 ln (2)t2i ∑i−1j=1 nj
n
1−log (1+2ε)
i
 ≤ k∑
i=2
1
ti
, (33)
with
T := Eu1≤n1 ,...,u
k
≤nk∼νa1,...,ak
Ex1<a1 ,...xk<ak∼P∥∥∥q(x1a1 , . . . , xkak |u1a1 , . . . ,ukak)− q(x1a1 |u1a1)⊗ . . .⊗ q(xkak |ukak)∥∥∥1 (34)
where q is the conditional box given the inputs uj<aj and outputs x
j
<aj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k
q(x1a1 , . . . , x
k
ak
|u1a1 , . . . ,ukak) := Px1<a1 ,...,xk<ak
u1<a1 ,...,u
k
<ak
(x1a1 , . . . , x
k
ak
|u1a1 , . . . ,ukak), (35)
and νa1,...,ak is the probability ν conditioned on measuring (a1, . . . , ak).
Proof. We first analyze the case when the k boxes (a1, . . . , ak) are chosen from the uniform distri-
bution over [n1] × . . . × [nk] and then consider the scenario where they are chosen from an ε-SV
source. With (a1, . . . , ak) chosen uniformly, we first show that each of the j boxes is approximately
in a product state with the previous j − 1 boxes. The product form of all boxes will then follow
by application of the triangle inequality.
Using the upper bound on mutual information I(A : B) ≤ min(log |A|, log |B|) and the chain
rule I(A : BC) = I(A : B) + I(A : C|B), we have
log |Σ|
k−1∑
j=1
nj ≥ Eu1≤n1 ,...,uk≤nk∼νI(x
1
≤n1 , . . . , x
k−1
≤nk−1 : x
k
≤nk)P
= Eu1≤n1 ,...,u
k
≤nk∼ν
(
I(x1≤n1 , . . . , x
k−1
≤nk−1 : x
k
1)P + . . .+ I(x
1
≤n1 , . . . , x
k−1
≤nk−1 : x
k
nk
|xk≤nk−1)P
)
(36)
Therefore, when ak is chosen from the uniform distribution U [nk], we get
Eak∼U [nk]Eu1≤n1 ,...,u
k
≤nk∼ν
Exk<ak∼P
I(x1≤n1 , . . . , x
k−1
≤nk−1 : x
k
ak
)q ≤
log |Σ|∑k−1j=1 nj
nk
. (37)
We now use Pinsker’s inequality relating the mutual information and trace distance as
I(A : B)p ≥ 1
2 ln (2)
‖pA,B − pA ⊗ pB‖21 , (38)
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and the convexity of x2 to obtain
Eak∼U [nk]Eu1≤n1 ,...,u
k
≤nk∼ν
Exk<ak∼P∥∥∥q(x1≤n1 , . . . , xk−1≤nk−1 , xkak |u1≤n1 , . . . ,uk−1≤nk−1 ,ukak)− q(x1≤n1 , . . . , xk−1≤nk−1 |u1≤n1 , . . . ,uk−1≤nk−1)⊗ q(xkak |ukak)∥∥∥1
≤
√
2 ln (2) log |Σ|∑k−1j=1 nj
nk
(39)
The above argument can also be applied to the box q(x1≤n1 , . . . , x
k−2
≤nk−2 , x
k−1
ak−1 |u1≤n1 , . . . ,uk−2≤nk−2 ,uk−1ak−1)
to give
Eak−1,ak∼U ([nk−1]×[nk])Eu1≤n1 ,...,u
k
≤nk∼ν
Exk−1<ak−1 ,xk<ak∼P∥∥∥q(x1≤n1 , . . . , xk−2≤nk−2 , xk−1ak−1 |u1≤n1 , . . . ,uk−2≤nk−2 ,uk−1ak−1)− q(x1≤n1 , . . . , xk−2≤nk−2 |u1≤n1 , . . . ,uk−2≤nk−2)⊗ q(xk−1ak−1 |uk−1ak−1)∥∥∥1
≤
√
2 ln (2) log |Σ|∑k−2j=1 nj
nk−1
(40)
Using Eqs. (45) and (40), the triangle inequality and the monotonicity of the 1-norm under
discarding subsystems, we obtain
Eak−1,ak∼U ([nk−1]×[nk])Eu1≤n1 ,...,u
k
≤nk∼ν
Exk−1<ak−1 ,xk<ak∼P
‖q(x1≤n1 , .., xk−2≤nk−2 , xk−1ak−1 , xkak |u1≤n1 , ..,uk−2≤nk−2 ,uk−1ak−1 ,ukak)−
q(x1≤n1 , .., x
k−2
≤nk−2 |u1≤n1 , ..,uk−2≤nk−2)⊗ q(xk−1ak−1 |uk−1ak−1)⊗ q(xkak |ukak)‖1
≤
√
2 ln (2) log |Σ|∑k−1j=1 nj
nk
+
√
2 ln (2) log |Σ|∑k−2j=1 nj
nk−1
(41)
Following the above reasoning for the (k − 2)th box up to the second we find
Ea1,...,ak∼U ([n1]×···×[nk]) Eu1≤n1 ,...,u
k
≤nk∼ν
Ex1<a1 ,...,xk<ak∼P∥∥∥q(x1a1 , . . . , xkak |u1a1 , . . . ,ukak)− q(x1a1 |u1a1)⊗ . . .⊗ q(xkak |ukak)∥∥∥1
≤
k∑
i=2
√
2 ln (2) log |Σ|∑i−1j=1 nj
ni
(42)
Let us now show how to extend the argument to the case when (a1, . . . , ak) are chosen from a
ε-SV source. Let
Ni := I(x1≤n1 , . . . , x
i−1
≤ni−1 : x
i
ai)q. (43)
From the chain-rule argument presented before we have
Eai∼U [ni]E(a1,...,ai−1,ai+1,...,ak)∼νaiEu1≤n1 ,...,u
k
≤nk∼νa1,...,ak
Exk<ai,...,<ak∼P
Ni
≤ log |Σ|
∑i−1
j=1 nj
ni
. (44)
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Then from the definition of a ε-SV source,
E(a1,...ak)∼νEu1≤n1 ,...,u
k
≤nk∼νa1,...,ak
Exk<ai,...,<ak∼P
Ni
= Eaj∼νE(a1,...,aj−1,aj+1,...,ak)∼νajEu1≤n1 ,...,u
k
≤nk∼νa1,...,ak
Exk<ai,...,<ak∼P
Ni
≤ ni
(
1
2
+ ε
)log(ni)
Eaj∼U [ni]E(a1,...,aj−1,aj+1,...,ak)∼νajEu1≤n1 ,...,u
k
≤nk∼νa1,...,ak
Exk<ai,...,<ak∼P
Ni
≤ ni
(
1
2
+ ε
)log(ni) log |Σ|∑i−1j=1 nj
ni
. (45)
Then by Pinsker’s inequality and the convexity of x2,
E(a1,...ak)∼νEu1≤n1 ,...,u
k
≤nk∼νa1,...,ak
Exk<ai,...,<ak∼P∥∥∥q(x1≤n1 , . . . , xi−1≤ni−1 , xiai |u1≤n1 , . . . ,ui−1≤ni−1 ,uiai)− q(x1≤n1 , . . . , xi−1≤ni−1 |u1≤n1 , . . . ,ui−1≤ni−1)⊗ q(xiai |uiai)∥∥∥1
≤
√
2 ln(2)n
log(1+2ε)
i
log |Σ|∑i−1j=1 nj
ni
. (46)
By Markov inequality,
Pr
(a1,...,ak)∼ν
Ti ≥
√
2 ln (2) log |Σ|ti
∑i−1
j=1 nj
ni
 ≤
√
n
log (1+2ε)
i
ti
, (47)
with
Ti := Eu1≤n1 ,...,u
k
≤nk∼νa1,...,ak
Exi<ai ,...,xk<ak∼P
(48)∥∥∥q(x1≤n1 , . . . , xi−1≤ni−1 , xiai |u1≤n1 , . . . ,ui−1≤ni−1 ,uiai)− q(x1≤n1 , . . . , xi−1≤ni−1 |u1≤n1 , . . . ,ui−1≤ni−1)⊗ q(xiai |uiai)∥∥∥1
However, by the triangle inequality and the monotonicity of the 1-norm under discarding
subsystems, we have that if for all 2 ≤ i ≤ k,
Ti <
√
2 ln (2) log |Σ|ti
∑i−1
j=1 nj
ni
=: ri, (49)
then
T <
k∑
i=2
ri. (50)
Therefore,
Pr
(a1,...,ak)∼ν([n1]×···×[nk])
(
T <
k∑
i=2
ri
)
≥ Pr
(a1,...,ak)∼η([n1]×···×[nk])
(T2 < r2 ∩ · · · ∩ Tk < rk)
= 1− Pr
(a1,...,ak)∼ν([n1]×···×[nk])
(T2 ≥ r2 ∪ · · · ∪ Tk ≥ rk)
≥ 1−
k∑
i=2
√
n
log (1+2ε)
i
ti
, (51)
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where the final inequality follows from the union bound and Eq.(47). This gives
Pr
(a1,...,ak)∼ν([n1]×···×[nk])
T ≥ k∑
i=2
√
8 ln (2)ti
∑i−1
j=1 nj
ni
 ≤ k∑
i=2
√
n
log (1+2ε)
i
ti
. (52)
Finally, to obtain Eq.(33), we replace ti by t2in
log (1+2ε)
i in the equation above uunionsq
C. Protocol verification procedure
In this section, we provide the proof that the verification procedure in the protocol works
correctly, i.e. when the test accepts, a fraction µ of the tested boxes have good Bell value. The
procedure consists in performing an estimation on the boxes denoted by (a1, . . . , ak), chosen with
the ε-SV source, and show that when the outcomes from these boxes pass a test, a fractionm = µk
of them have good Bell value.
For simplicity, in this section we will use the notation (1, . . . , k) in place of (a1, . . . , ak). We
say a no-signaling box P (x1, . . . , xk|u1, . . . ,uk) and a choice of inputs (u1, . . . ,uk) and outputs
(x1, . . . , xk) are (µ, δ)-good if for all l ∈ A, with A a subset of {1, . . . , k} of size larger than µk,
B.{Px1,...,xl−1
u1,...,ul−1
(xl|ul)} < δ. (53)
Here Px1,...,xl−1
u1,...,ul−1
(xl|ul) is the box conditioned on the inputs u1, . . . ,ul−1 and the outcomes
x1, . . . , xl−1.
Let us consider the test where one computes the empirical violation average of the constraints
in B:
Zk :=
1
k
k∑
l=1
B(xl,ul), (54)
accepts if
Zk ≤
(
1
2
− ε
)4
(1− µ)δ
2
, (55)
and rejects otherwise.
Lemma 7. The test described above rejects with probability larger than 1 −
exp
(
−k (12 − ε)8 (1− µ)2δ2/8) unless ((u1, . . . ,uk), (x1, . . . , xk), P (x1, . . . , xk|u1, . . . ,uk)) are
(µ, δ)-good.
Proof. Assume that ((u1, . . . ,uk), (x1, . . . , xk), P (x1, . . . , xk|u1, . . . ,uk)) are not (µ, δ)-good. Let us
show the test rejects with probability greater or equal to 1− exp
(
−k (12 − ε)8 (1− µ)2δ2/8).
Define
δl := B.{Px1,...,xl−1
u1,...,ul−1
(xl|ul)}. (56)
Then by the definition of a ε-SV source we have that
Eul∼νExl∼Px1,...,xl−1
u1,...,ul−1
(xl|ul)B(xl,ul) ≥
(
1
2
− ε
)4
δl =: ζl. (57)
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Let us define
Xl :=
l∑
i=1
(ζi −B(xi,ui)). (58)
We claim {X1, . . . , Xk} form a supermartingale with respect to {(x1,u1), . . . , (xk,uk)}. Indeed
we have
E(Xl|(x1,u1), . . . , (xl−1,ul−1)) = Xl−1 + ζl − E(B(xl,ul)|(x1,u1), . . . , (xl−1,ul−1)) ≤ Xl−1 (59)
where the last inequality follows from Eq. (68) as follows:
E(B(xl,ul)|(x1,u1), . . . , (xl−1,ul−1))
=
∑
ul,...,uk
∑
xl,...,xk
ν(ul, . . . ,uk|(x1,u1), . . . , (xl−1,ul−1))Px1,...,xl−1
u1,...,ul−1
(xl, . . . , xk|u1, . . . ,uk)B(xl,ul)
=
∑
ul
∑
xl
ν(ul|(x1,u1), . . . , (xl−1,ul−1))Px1,...,xl−1
u1,...,ul−1
(xl|ul)B(xl,ul)
≥
(
1
2
− ε
)4∑
ul
∑
xl
Px1,...,xl−1
u1,...,ul−1
(xl|ul)B(xl,ul) =
(
1
2
− ε
)4
δl = ζl. (60)
Moreover |Xl − Xl−1| ≤ 1 since B(xi,ui) ∈ {0, 1} and 0 ≤ δl ≤ 8 (the maximum value of
the Bell expression by normalization) giving 0 ≤ ζl ≤ 12 . Thus by Azuma-Hoeffding inequality
(Lemma 8) taking X0 = 0 we find
Pr (Xk ≥ t) ≤ e−t2/2k. (61)
Rearranging terms and defining s := t/k,
Pr
(
Zk ≤ 1
k
k∑
i=1
ζi − s
)
≤ e−s2k/2. (62)
Since ((u1, . . . ,uk), (x1, . . . , xk), P (x1, . . . , xk|u1, . . . ,uk)) are not (µ, δ)-good,
k∑
i=1
ζi =
(
1
2
− ε
)4 k∑
i=1
δi ≥
(
1
2
− ε
)4
(1− µ)kδ, (63)
and so
Pr
(
Zk ≤
(
1
2
− ε
)4
(1− µ)δ − s
)
≤ e−s2k/2. (64)
Taking s =
(
1
2 − ε
)4
(1− µ) δ2 gives the result. uunionsq
In the proof above, we used the notion of supermartingales and the associated Azuma-
Hoeffding inequality which we recount here for convenience. Let X0, . . . , Xk and Y0, . . . , Yk be
two sequences of random variables. Then X0, . . . , Xk is said to be a supermartingale with respect
to Y0, . . . , Yk if for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k, E|Xi| <∞ and E(Xi|Y0, . . . , Yi−1) ≤ Xi−1.
Lemma 8. (Azuma-Hoeffding) Suppose X0, . . . , Xk is a supermartingale with respect to Y0, . . . , Yk, and
that |Xl+1 −Xl| ≤ cl for all 0 ≤ l ≤ k − 1. Then for all positive reals t,
Pr (Xk −X0 ≥ t) ≤ exp
(
− t
2
2
∑k
l=1 c
2
l
)
. (65)
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D. Robustness of the Protocol
In the remainder of this section, we would like to estimate the amount of noise that the
protocol can tolerate. Suppose we are given a box such that for every inputs and outputs,
((u1, . . . ,uk), (x1, . . . , xk), P (x1, . . . , xk|u1, . . . ,uk)) are (1, δ˜)-good. This will be the case, for ex-
ample, if all the the entangled states and measurements used to produce a box are onlyO(δ˜)-close
to the ones that would lead to a box violating maximally the Bell inequality (i.e. k copies of the
entangled state given by Eq. (8), each measured in the bases given by Eqs. (9) and (10).
Lemma 9. Consider the verification procedure applied a triple
((u1, . . . ,uk), (x1, . . . , xk), P (x1, . . . , xk|u1, . . . ,uk)) which is (1, δ˜)-good. Then the test accepts
with probability 1− exp
(
−k(1/2−ε)8(1−µ)2δ22048
)
as long as
δ˜ ≤ (1− µ)δ(
1
2 − ε)4f(ε)
4(12 + ε)
4
, (66)
where f(ε) :=
(
1
2 + ε
)4
+
(
1
2 − ε
)4
+ 4
(
1
2 − ε
)3 (1
2 + ε
)
+ 2
(
1
2 − ε
)2 (1
2 + ε
)2.
Proof. The proof follows similarly to that of Lemma 7. We have that for all 1 ≤ l ≤ k,
δl := B.{Px1,...,xl−1
u1,...,ul−1
(xl|ul)} ≤ δ˜. (67)
By the definition of the ε-SV source
Eul∼νExl∼Px1,...,xl−1
u1,...,ul−1
(xl|ul)B(xl,ul) ≤
(
1
2 + ε
)4
f(ε)
δl =: ζ˜l, (68)
with the norm defined by f(ε) :=
(
1
2 + ε
)4
+
(
1
2 − ε
)4
+ 4
(
1
2 − ε
)3 (1
2 + ε
)
+ 2
(
1
2 − ε
)2 (1
2 + ε
)2.
This follows since (
1
2
+ε)
4
f(ε) is the maximum probability of any set of four measurements.
Defining
X˜l :=
l∑
i=1
(B(xi,ui)− ζ˜i), (69)
and following Eq. (60), we find
E(X˜l|(x1,u1), . . . , (xl−1,ul−1)) = X˜l−1 + E(B(xl,ul)|(x1,u1), . . . , (xl−1,ul−1))− ζ˜l ≤ X˜l−1. (70)
In other words, {X˜1, . . . , X˜k} form a supermartingale with respect to {(x1,u1), . . . , (xk,uk)}.
Since |X˜l − X˜l−1| ≤ 8 by Lemma 8 (with X˜0 = 0),
Pr
(
Zk ≥ 1
k
k∑
i=1
ζ˜i + s
)
≤ e−s2k/128. (71)
When ((u1, . . . ,uk), (x1, . . . , xk), P (x1, . . . , xk|u1, . . . ,uk)) are (1, δ˜)-good, we know that
k∑
i=1
ζ˜i =
(12 + ε)
4
f(ε)
k∑
i=1
δi =
(12 + ε)
4
f(ε)
kδ˜ (72)
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Choosing s = (
1
2
−ε)4(1−µ)δ
4 , we find that when
δ˜ ≤ (1− µ)δ(
1
2 − ε)4f(ε)
4(12 + ε)
4
, (73)
we have
Pr
(
Zk ≤
(1− µ)δ(12 − ε)4
2
)
≥ 1− e
(
− k(
1
2−ε)
8(1−µ)2δ2
211
)
, (74)
so that the test is passed with high probability. uunionsq
V. CONCLUSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
We have presented a protocol for obtaining secure random bits from an arbitrarily (but not
fully) deterministic ε-SV source. The protocol uses correlations violating a four-party Bell in-
equality, includes an explicit hash function, and works even with correlations attainable by noisy
quantum mechanical resources, producing a bit ε′-close to random with O(log (1/ε′)) devices.
Moreover the correctness of the protocol is not based on quantum mechanics and only requires
the no-signalling principle.
We leave the following open questions to future research:
• Is there a randomness amplification protocol secure against no-signaling adversaries using
only a finite number of devices? While such protocols may be formulated assuming a set
of independent boxes (i.e. an “individual attack” by the eavesdropper), a proof for general
coherent attacks is lacking.
• Can randomness amplification be based on a bipartite Bell inequality, i.e., are there bipartite
Bell inequalities which allow algebraic violation by quantum correlations in addition to
incorporating randomness?
• Is there a protocol that can tolerate a higher level of noise? What if we assume the validity
of quantum mechanics?
• Can we amplify randomness from other different types of sources? A particularly interest-
ing case is the min-entropy source [9].
• A more technical question is to improve the de Finetti theorem given in [23, 24]. What are
the limits of de Finetti type results when the subsystems are selected from a Santha-Vazirani
source?
• Finally suppose one would like to realize device-independent quantum key distribution
with only an imperfect SV source as the randomness source. Is there an efficient protocol
for that tolerating a constant rate of noise and giving a constant rate of key? Here the
question is open for both quantum-mechanical and non-signalling adversaries.
Acknowledgments. The paper is supported by ERC AdG grant QOLAPS and by Foundation for
Polish Science TEAM project co-financed by the EU European Regional Development Fund. FB
17
acknowledges support from EPSRC. Part of this work was done in National Quantum Informa-
tion Center of Gdan´sk.
[1] M. Santha and U. V. Vazirani. Generating Quasi-Random Sequences from Slightly-Random Sources.
Proceedings of the 25th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS’84), 434 (1984).
[2] J. Barrett and N. Gisin. How Much Measurement Independence Is Needed to Demonstrate Nonlocal-
ity? Phys. Rev. Lett. 106, 100406 (2011).
[3] M. J. W. Hall. Local Deterministic Model of Singlet State Correlations Based on Relaxing Measurement
Independence. Phys. Rev. Lett. 105, 250404 (2010).
[4] R. Colbeck and R. Renner. Free randomness can be amplified. Nature Physics 8, 450 (2012).
[5] R. Gallego, L. Masanes, G. de la Torre, C. Dhara, L. Aolita and A. Acin. Full randomness from arbi-
trarily deterministic events. arXiv:1210.6514 (2012).
[6] P. Mironowicz and M. Pawłowski. Amplification of arbitrarily weak randomness. arXiv:1301.7722
(2013).
[7] A. Grudka, K. Horodecki, M. Horodecki, P. Horodecki, M. Pawlowski and R. Ramanathan. Free ran-
domness amplification using bipartite chain correlations. arXiv:1303.5591 (2013).
[8] J. E. Pope and A. Kay. Limited Free Will in Multiple Runs of a Bell Test. arXiv:1304.4904 (2013).
[9] L. P. Thinh, L. Sheridan and V. Scarani. Bell tests with min-entropy sources. arXiv:1304.3598 (2013).
[10] M. Plesch and M. Pivoluska. Single Min-Entropy Random Source can be Amplified. arXiv:1305.0990
(2013).
[11] R. Colbeck and A. Kent. Private Randomness Expansion With Untrusted Devices. Journal of Physics
A: Mathematical and Theoretical 44(9), 095305 (2011).
[12] S. Pironio et al. Random numbers certified by Bell’s theorem. Nature 464, 1021 (2010).
[13] S. Pironio and S. Massar. Security of practical private randomness generation. Phys. Rev. A 87, 012336
(2013).
[14] S. Fehr, R. Gelles, and C. Schaffner. Security and Composability of Randomness Expansion from Bell
Inequalities. arXiv:1111.6052.
[15] R. Colbeck, PhD dissertation. Quantum And Relativistic Protocols For Secure Multi-Party Computa-
tion. University of Cambridge, arXiv:0911.3814 (2009).
[16] A. Acin, S. Massar and S. Pironio. Randomness versus Nonlocality and Entanglement. Phys. Rev. Lett.
108, 100402 (2012).
[17] J. Barrett, L. Hardy and A. Kent. No Signaling and Quantum Key Distribution. Phys. Rev. Lett. 95,
010503 (2005).
[18] Ll. Masanes. Universally Composable Privacy Amplification from Causality Constraints. Phys. Rev.
Lett. 102, 140501 (2009).
[19] E. Ha¨nggi, R. Renner and S. Wolf. Efficient Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution. EURO-
CRYPT 2010, 216 (2010).
[20] U. Vazirani and T. Vidick. Certifiable Quantum Dice - Or, testable exponential randomness expansion.
arXiv:1111.6054.
[21] U. Vazirani and T. Vidick. Fully device independent quantum key distribution. arXiv:1210.1810.
[22] M. Coudron, T. Vidick, and H. Yuen. Robust Randomness Amplifiers: Upper and Lower Bounds.
arXiv:1305.6626.
[23] F. G. S. L. Brandao and A. W. Harrow. Quantum de Finetti Theorems under Local Measurements with
Applications. STOC 2013: 861-870. arXiv: 1210.6367 (2012).
[24] F. G. S. L. Brandao and A. W. Harrow. Product-state Approximations to Quantum Groundstates. STOC
2013: 871-880.
[25] O. Guehne, G. Toth, P. Hyllus and H. Briegel, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 120405 (2005).
